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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1      INTRODUCTION 
Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world. It is estimated that 68% of the 
population live below the poverty line1. It is ranked number 165 out of 177 in the 
United Nations Development Programme human development index.2 The average 
life expectancy is 37.7 years3.  Nicholas Haysom states that: 
 
…within the narrow world of political/civil rights there is a recognition that citizens 
need more than access to the ballot box to be empowered to act as citizens. The 
constitution cannot be allowed to sanction second or third class citizenship. It is for 
this same reason that certain socio-economic rights need to be treated as fundamental 
rights. Can an illiterate, hungry person participate in the political process let alone 
social life? Does a marginalised, rural woman – untrained and unemployed – have 
anything remotely akin to civic equality to her urban middle-class male compatriot? 
The question barely needs an answer. 4  
 
Over the four decades of Zambia’s independence there have been four different 
constitutions. The current Constitution was the first to introduce socio-economic 
rights into the main body of the Constitution, but only as non-justiciable directive 
principles of state policy. Since their introduction ten years ago, there has been no 
jurisprudence relating to these rights. They are simply not seen as rights that can be 
claimed and enforced. Currently, Zambians have no right to claim food, water, 
housing, education, health and other basic necessities of life. It is for this reason that 
socio-economic rights need to be treated as fundamental rights. This chapter begins 
by stating the aim of the paper then gives a brief historical background of the 
Zambian Constitution and the status of socio-economic rights. It then goes into the 
significance of the study and concludes with the chapter outline.   
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Central Statistical Office (Zambia) at www.zamstats.gov.zm/ [accessed 29/01/07]. 
2
 United Nations Development Programme human development index at 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr.2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_ZMB.html [accessed on 
22/03/2007].  
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Nicholas Haysom, ‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic rights’, (1992) 8  
S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts at p 451(now referred to as “Haysom”) at p 460. 
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1.2 AIMS OF STUDY 
With the majority of the population languishing in poverty it is evident that the socio-
economic rights of the people of Zambia are not being fulfilled. Following the 
recommendations of the Mung’omba Commission, this study examines the need for 
justiciable socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights of the Zambian Constitution. 
The nature of the rights and various ways of implementing them will be reviewed. 
There will also be discussion as to how best the justiciable socio-economic rights can 
be effectively implemented and enforced. In this paper “justiciable” means “the 
ability to judicially determine whether or not a person’s right has been violated or 
whether the state has failed to meet a constitutionally recognised obligation to respect, 
protect or fulfil a person’s right”.5 When writing about the inclusion of justiciable 
socio-economic rights in a constitution, many writers have concluded that they have 
no place in any constitution because of their nature and because, they claim, enforcing 
them infringes on the principle of separation of powers. During the course of the 
paper I will address these arguments and look at the arguments for adopting 
justiciable socio-economic rights and the need for them to be enshrined in the 
Zambian Bill of Rights. 
 
 
1.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ZAMBIAN CONSTITUTION 
AND THE STATUS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
1.3.1 The pre-independence Constitution  
Pre-colonialism the many tribes that now make up the Zambian people lived 
communally in villages headed by chiefs.6 Without recognising them as socio-
economic rights the people shared their food, looked after the sick and elderly, and 
took care of each other’s children. These units remained intact to some extent after the 
advent of colonialism but with it came forced labour, which for many men meant 
moving away from the villages, and the idea of being taxed by the colonialists.7 By 
1900 British rule of different parts of what is now called Zambia was made official by 
                                               
5
 Craig Scott and Patrick Macklem, ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? social rights 
in a new South African constitution’, (November 1992), 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (now referred to as “Scott 
and Macklem” at [*17].    
6
 Osita C. Eze, ‘Human rights and social justice: an African perspective’, Annual Lecture Series No. 4, 
Empowerment and Action Research Centre at p 24 – 30. 
7
 For a discussion on African colonial history see Osita C. Eze supra.  
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two orders: the North-Western Rhodesia-Barotseland Order-in-Council of 1899 and 
the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1900.8 In 1911 the territories were 
merged into what became known as Northern Rhodesia.9 Barotseland was granted 
special status as a British Protectorate after agreeing to let the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) have sole control over its trading and mining rights.10 Rule by the 
BSAC ended on 1st February 1924 and colonial rule under a Governor was established 
by an Order-in-Council.11 During colonial rule the territory did not have its own 
constitution, only that provided by Westminster.12 There were several decrees by the 
British government referred to as “Constitutions” enacted through Orders-in-
Council.13 They could be amended in response to particular needs.14 They aimed to 
promote governance by the white settlers and acquiescence by the Africans hence 
there were few socio-economic rights given to the native people. In 1953 the Central 
African Federation, made up of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, was formed.15 The colonialists saw it as a way of imposing indirect rule 
through white settler control.16 Federalism only led to increased African nationalism 
and by 1963 the Federation had collapsed.17 Full suffrage arrived in January 1964 and 
in that year Kenneth David Kaunda was elected the last Prime Minister of Northern 
Rhodesia.18  Northern Rhodesia gained its independence on 24th October 1964 and 
was renamed Zambia. 
 
1.3.2  The independence Constitution of 1964 
Zambia was the first British colony to become a republic immediately upon gaining 
independence.19 Under the 1964 Constitution all legislative powers were vested in 
Parliament which was made up of the President and the National Assembly.20 The 
                                               
8
 Muna Ndulo and Robert B. Kent, ‘Constitutionalism in Zambia: past, present and future’, (1996) Vol. 
40, No. 2, Journal of African Law, Liber Amicorum for Professor James S. Read, p256-278 (now 
referred to as Ndulo and Kent) at p258 .  
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Op cit at p259. 
12
 Supra n.11. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 United States of America state department, ‘Constitution, government & legislation’, (now referred 
to as “US State Dept”) at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/world/zambia.htm [accessed December 2007]. 
20
 Ndulo and Kent p261. 
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judiciary was made up of the High Court, with original and unlimited jurisdiction, and 
the Court of Appeal, the highest court, with appellate jurisdiction.21 The judiciary was 
relatively independent but occasionally suffered from political interference.22 The Bill 
of Rights in the 1964 Constitution was extensive and included the following rights: 
liberty, life, security of the person and the protection of law, freedom of conscience, 
expression and assembly and association, freedom for the privacy of the home and 
other property, and freedom from deprivation of property without compensation.23 
However, no socio-economic rights were included in the Constitution. The 
fundamental rights were granted without discrimination on the ground of race, place 
of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex.24 They were qualified by detailed 
claw-back clauses which the government used to interfere with peoples’ rights.25 The 
provisions regarding non-discrimination in relation to race, sex and place of origin did 
not apply to customary law thus marginalising women in society. The rights in the 
Bill of Rights were justiciable and the courts handled many such cases. However, the 
judiciary was cautious in cases with political implications.26 Cases concerning 
detention without trial under the state of emergency were restricted by the claw-back 
clauses. Despite this, judicial review was established as a principle which helped the 
protection of human rights in later years.27 The 1964 Constitution introduced more 
stringent procedures for the amendment of the Constitution; to amend the Constitution 
a vote of at least two-thirds of the National Assembly was required.28 To amend the 
fundamental rights under the Constitution a bill could not be enacted without approval 
by a national referendum.29 In 1969 the provision requiring a national referendum to 
amend the fundamental rights was repealed by a constitutional amendment termed the 
“referendum to end all referenda”.30 It intended to make it easier to amend the 
provision relating to the right to property but had far-reaching consequences.31 The 
clause was an obstacle to government plans for wide-scale nationalisation of private 
                                               
21
 Op cit p262. 
22
 Supra n.21, discussed in chapter 4. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Op cit p 264. 
28
 Supra. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
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businesses.32 It eventually made it easier to adopt a one-party government system as 
the entire Constitution could be changed without the need for a national referendum. 
   
1.3.3 The 1973 Constitution facilitating a one-party state   
In 1973, following the report of a constitutional review commission headed by the 
then Vice-President Mainza Chona, the 1964 constitution was replaced by one 
creating a socialist, one-party state. That party was the United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) and its leader was Kenneth David Kaunda. The idea behind the 
formation of a one-party state was to unify the country which Kaunda feared was 
divided by political factionalism along tribal lines. The slogan “One Zambia, One 
Nation” was used liberally to symbolise the unified nation. Humanism, a poorly 
understood concept, was the philosophy behind the state as contained in the preamble 
of the Constitution33. The concept of Humanism as noted in the preamble “declared 
the right of all men freely to determine and build their own political, economic and 
social system by ways and means of their own free choice”.34 The Constitution itself 
recognised “the protection of life, liberty and property, freedom of conscience, 
expression and association within the context of our National Constitution”. 35  
 
It is surprising that the humanist socialist government did not provide for socio-
economic rights given its emphasis on human development. Instead, the rights that 
were provided were largely ineffective because of the wide powers of the executive. 
Freedom of speech and assembly could only be exercised within the ruling UNIP 
party.36 The President had powers to detain people without trial;37 political opponents 
became targets of these laws. The Constitution allowed for the use of the Emergency 
Powers Act and the Public Security Regulations when a state of emergency was 
declared in the country.38 Zambia was under a state of emergency for most of the pre- 
and post-independence period.39 The police were given sweeping powers during this 
time. When it came to elections the ruling party only presented one candidate to 
                                               
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Op cit p 266. 
34
 Supra n.33. 
35
 Ibid citing The Constitution of Zambia Act 1973 Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia, emphasis added. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
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which the electorate had to vote yes or no.40 The State had a controlling interest in 
most of the local industries.  
 
1.3.4 The 1991 Constitution 
In December 1990, following a series of shortages of essential commodities and 
general dissatisfaction with the iron-fisted leadership of the country, civil unrest grew 
in the country culminating in riots in the capital and a coup attempt which, though 
unsuccessful, eventually led Kaunda to sign legislation ending one-party rule.41 The 
tide turned in favour of multi-party democracy and after negotiations with opposition 
parties a new constitution was enacted in August 1991.42 On 31st October 1991 
elections were held and the opposition party the Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy (MMD) came into power in a landslide victory.43 
 
The new constitution increased the maximum number of National Assembly members 
from 136 to 158, established an electoral commission and allowed more than one 
presidential candidate to stand from any political party.44  The reference to humanism 
in the preamble was removed.45 Article 1 declared the Constitution the supreme law 
of the land and any law inconsistent with it was void to the extent of the 
inconsistency.46 This strengthened the role of the judiciary. The protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual were provided for but the 
limitations contained in the 1973 Constitution were maintained.47 An example of this 
was the exclusion of the principle of non-discrimination in relation to customary 
law.48  Freedom of movement was still subject to detention laws. However, the 
imposition of a state of emergency was made subject to the approval of Parliament.49 
The provision that a national referendum was required for an amendment to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms in Part III of the Constitution was re-introduced.50 
                                               
40
 Op cit p 267. 
41
 US State Dept. 
42
 US State Dept. 
43
 Ndulo and Kent p 270. 
44
 US State Dept. 
45
 Ndulo and Kent p 269. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Op cit p 270. 
48
 Supra n.47. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Ibid. 
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Socio-economic rights were included in the preamble as mere aspirations of the state51 
and thus were not rights in the real sense of the word. The Constitution strengthened 
the principle of separation of powers and reduced executive powers.52 Following the 
return of multi-party democracy the economy was liberalised: privatisation and 
structural adjustment programmes became the order of the day. 
 
1.3.5 The 1996 Constitution 
In 1991 a Constitutional Review Commission headed by John Mwanakatwe was 
charged with reviewing the 1991 Constitution and the previously repealed 
Constitutions, two years after the existing Constitution had come into effect.53 It had 
been formed to fulfil an election promise by the MMD to replace the 1991 
Constitution with one that would be non-partisan and strengthen democracy and the 
protection of human rights.54   Its terms of reference were broad:  
 
[to] ensure that Zambia is governed in a manner that will promote the democratic 
principles of regular and fair elections, transparency and accountability, and that will 
guard against the re-emergence of a dictatorial form of government; …appropriate 
arrangements for the entrenchment and protection of human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance;…the competence, impartiality and independence of the 
judiciary…55 
 
The Commission was also requested to recommend “whether the Constitution should 
be adopted by National Assembly or by a Constituent Assembly, by a National 
Referendum or by any other method; …[and] a suitable method for amending any part 
of the Constitution”.56 After extensive consultations with the people of Zambia the 
Commission made several recommendations including the following: 57 
 
                                               
51
 The Constitution of Zambia (1991) Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia.  
52
 Ndulo and Kent p 271. 
53
 Ibid. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Op cit p 272 referring to the Terms of reference of the Commission (1), (2), (3), (4) contained in 
statutory instrument No. 151 of 1993. 
56
 Ibid citing term of reference (9). 
57
 Op cit p 272-273. 
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• The Constitution should be adopted by Constituent Assembly consisting of a 
wide cross-section of society, being the most representative means of 
adoption;58 
• It included a list of “Directive Principles of State Policy” being aspirations of 
all branches of the government for administration, law-making and 
adjudication, these included socio-economic rights. The Commission insisted 
that these principles be non-justiciable59 as it felt that the State did not have 
adequate resources to implement them60; 
•  It recommended strengthening some human rights like freedom of the press;  
and adding others like residence, human dignity and reputation, culture, 
marriage, a clean environment and equal pay for equal work;61  
• Academic and intellectual freedom were recommended for protection;62 
• Women’s rights were to be improved by the abolition of the discriminatory 
cultural and other practices;63 
• It included economic protection of women such as maternity leave, and an 
article on children’s rights was provided;64 
• It was suggested that the locus standi of those claiming fundamental rights be 
widened;65 
• It recommended that some of the claw-back clauses to the fundamental rights 
be removed;66 and 
• The Commission recommended the introduction of a Constitutional Court to 
adjudicate on constitutional matters;67    
• The Commission proposed the creation of a human rights commission to 
investigate human rights violations and promote human rights;68 
                                               
58
 Ibid referring to the Report of the Constitutional Review Commission 1995 (now referred to as the 
“Mwanakatwe Report”), Chapter 27, recommendation 27 and 27(1).  
59
 Ibid referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 4 paragraphs 4.0-4.3.7. 
60
 Report on the Constitutional Review Commission, December 2005 (now referred to as the 
“Mung’omba Report”) at p 192. 
61
 Ibid, referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 7, paragraph 7.2, 15.   
62
 Ibid, referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 7, paras 7.2.17 and 7.2.20, 18 and 19. 
63
 Ibid, referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 7, para 7.2.21, 19. 
64
 Ibid, referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 7, para 7.2.23, 19. 
65
 Ibid, referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 7, para 7.6, 21. 
66
 Op cit p 273. 
67
 Ibid. 
68
 Op cit p 274. 
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• It proposed the restriction of the declaration of a state of emergency to 
situations where there was the threat of invasion, rebellion or natural 
disaster.69 The Commission recommended that these powers be kept in check 
by being subject to judicial review by a Constitutional Court.70  
 
At least 70% of the Mwanakatwe Commission’s recommendations were rejected71 by 
the government. The government rejected the addition of many of the new individual 
rights, the creation of a Constitutional Court, the proposals for women’s rights, and 
the proposals to create an independent Electoral Commission.72 However it did accept 
the recommendations concerning the creation of a human rights commission and the 
introduction of non-justiciable directive principles of state policy.73 Significantly the 
government rejected proposals to adopt the constitutional amendments through a 
Constituent Assembly. The new Constitution came into being through the enactment 
of the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act 1996 despite heavy criticism from 
civil society.74 The entire 1991 Constitution was repealed apart from Part III 
containing the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual which amendment 
required a national referendum. The 1996 Constitution remains in place. 
 
1.3.5.1 Principles of the Current Zambian Constitution    
Under Article 1(3) of the Zambian Constitution the Constitution is the supreme law of 
the land and any other law that is inconsistent with it is void to the extent of the 
inconsistency.75 The Constitution makes no mention of the status of international law 
in Zambia.76 But Zambia uses a dualist system meaning that the international treaties 
it ratifies must be domesticated by an act of Parliament before they can become law.77 
Although not specifically contained in the Constitution Zambia adheres to the 
principle of separation of powers. Zambia follows the Bangalore Principles which 
                                               
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid referring to the Mwanakatwe Report Chapter 10, paras 10.0-10.10. 
71
 Alfred W. Chanda, ‘The challenge of making a durable constitution in Zambia’, a paper presented to 
the Law Association of Zambia Annual General Meeting between 25th and 26th April 2003 (now 
referred to as “Alfred W. Chanda”) at p 5.  
72
 Ndulo and Kent p 274. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Article 1(3) of the Constitution of Zambia (1996) Chapter  1, Volume 1 of the Laws of Zambia. 
76
 Professor Alfred W Chanda, ‘Zambia’ in Christof Heyns (ed), Vol. 2  Human rights in Africa, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2004 at p 1685. 
77
 Ibid. 
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require that national courts interpret national legislation in a way that is not 
inconsistent with international human rights treaties to which it is party.78 
 
1.3.6 The current constitutional review: The Mung’omba Commission 
The Mung’omba Constitutional Review Commission was formed in 2003 against the 
background of severe criticism over previous Constitution’s rejection of the majority 
of the peoples’ submissions.79 Although not as popular a cause as the adoption of the 
Constitution by a Constituent Assembly, the Commission did receive considerable 
number of submissions in favour of enshrining justiciable socio-economic rights in 
the Bill of Rights. This cause has particularly been championed by the Church.80 The 
Mung’omba Commission has recommended that socio-economic rights should be 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights as justiciable rights.81 It also stated that the State 
should take reasonable legislative and other measures to realise these rights 
progressively within available resources.82 Contrary to the view of the two previous 
constitutional review commissions, the Mung’omba Commission found that financial 
constraints were not an excuse for depriving the Zambian people of socio-economic 
rights.83 The Commission recognised that civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights were indivisible and interdependent stating for example that freedom 
of expression could not be adequately exercised without the right to education.84 It 
observed that people often consider socio-economic rights as costly but stated that the 
protection of any right has a cost which any country should be prepared to spend 
money to guarantee its citizens socio-economic rights.85 They also recommended the 
establishment of a constitutional court to decide on constitutional matters86 and the 
adoption of the Constitution by a Constituent Assembly. Civil society is largely in 
favour of the Mung’omba Commission’s recommendations. The official government 
response to the Mung’omba Report has yet to be released. This study seeks to support 
                                               
78
 Ibid. 
79
 Mung’omba Report at p 68. 
80
 See Simson Mwale, ‘Can we afford economic, social and cultural rights in the constitution?, A paper 
presented at the Alliance Francaise on 20th April 2006 for the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection 
available at www.jctr.org.zm [accessed December 2006].  
81
 Mung’omba Report at p195. 
82
 Ibid p196. 
83
 Mung’omba Report at p 193. 
84
 Op cit at p 192. 
85
 Op cit p 193. 
86
 Op cit at p 203 and 204. 
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the Commission’s recommendations for the need for justiciable socio-economic rights 
in the Zambian Constitution      
 
1.4 CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The majority of Zambians do not have access to basic necessities of life and have no 
voice to raise their concerns about their quality of life. As this Chapter has 
demonstrated, socio-economic rights have been given scant protection in various 
Constitutions adopted in Zambia to date. These rights hold the key to facilitating 
access to basic services by poor people, empowering them and restoring their dignity. 
The aim of the paper is therefore to consider the need for justiciable socio-economic 
rights in the Zambian context. Chapter 2 surveys a range of the arguments commonly 
advanced against introducing justiciable socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights. It 
is argued that these arguments are ill-conceived and constitute a misunderstanding of 
the nature of rights and the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy.  A case 
for protecting these rights as justiciable rights is presented. Chapter 3 looks at various 
ways in which socio-economic rights have been given domestic application in 
different countries and argues that the best approach is to enshrine them in a Bill of 
Rights. Chapter 4 considers the specific circumstances in Zambia and demonstrates 
why a justiciable set of socio-economic rights should be included in the Zambian Bill 
of Rights. Chapter 5 concludes the discussion and makes some final 
recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST INCLUDING 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN A JUSTICIABLE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the Bill of Rights in constitutions worldwide have, with few exceptions, 
only included what are known as negative, as opposed to positive, rights. A positive 
right “is a claim to something [from the state]…while a negative right is a right that 
something not be done to one”87 by the state. Socio-economic rights are seen as 
positive rights as they require positive action. Many reasons have been advanced 
against protecting socio-economic rights full rights on a par with civil and political 
rights. The resistance to socio-economic rights is not new. Controversy arose soon 
after adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),88 as steps to 
translate the UDHR into binding treaty obligations were being taken after 1948.  
States were sharply divided over whether the rights should be afforded equal status.89 
The result was the adoption of two separate instruments, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).90  This marked a triumph for opponents of 
socio-economic rights as these rights were given weaker enforcement mechanisms in 
the ICESCR than their counterparts in the ICCPR.  
 
Zambia has been greatly influenced by this negativity to socio-economic rights. All 
previous constitutional review commissions argued against the incorporation of these 
rights in the Bill of Rights. It is only the Mung’omba Commission that has displayed 
a positive attitude to these rights. Unfortunately, the Mung’omba Commission did not 
provide detailed reasons for its conclusion. It is therefore critical that the arguments 
often made against the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution as 
justiciable rights be investigated, analysed and critiqued.  
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2.2 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
All of the objections to the implementation of socio-economic rights relate to either 
their very nature or the argument that implementing them would breach the doctrine 
of separation of powers adhered to in most jurisdictions, including Zambia. They are 
discussed in detail below. 
 
2.2.1 The Bill of Rights should only contain negative rights. 
This argument is based on the idea that a Bill of Rights should only prevent the state 
from interfering in an individual’s actions. Positive rights on the other hand, require 
positive action to be taken by the government and is therefore an expensive 
undertaking. First of all, I would argue that not all negative rights protected in a Bill 
of rights are purely negative in nature. For instance the right to a fair trial, a 
“negative” right, requires the government to create and maintain a judiciary, provide 
courts, interpreters, and even legal counsel for the indigent. All these come at a cost. 
The case of Airey v Ireland91 illustrates this point. The court in that case held that the 
right to a fair trial extended to the right to legal aid funding. The counter-argument to 
this proposition is that government will only be made to spend resources on issues 
that it should have been spending them on in the first place. As the Mung’omba 
Report put it: 
 
Protection of any right has a cost, and the country should be prepared to spend 
resources in order to guarantee its citizens a minimum of economic, social and 
cultural rights. The fact that a country is poor does not constitute a legitimate excuse 
for it to avoid striving to ensure that its citizens enjoy economic, social and cultural 
rights such as the right to adequate food, education and health care.92   
  
The court’s decision need not always involve resource allocation. It can merely point 
out the violation and instruct the relevant authority to remedy it in the most 
appropriate way.93 In the case of Cruz del Valle Bermudez v Ministry of Health and 
Social Action,94 the Venezuelan Supreme Court considered whether people living 
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with HIV/AIDS had the right to free life-saving medication.95 The court found that at 
the heart of the right to health was a positive duty to prevent illness and ordered the 
Ministry of Health to conduct a study into the minimum requirements of people with 
HIV/AIDS and to present it for consideration at the next budget.96 Amartya Sen 
acknowledges that there is a theoretical distinction between positive and negative 
rights but asks: “Why is it important that I should not be stopped from doing 
something and unimportant whether or not I can in fact do that thing?”97 As the 
Mung’omba report points out, positive and negative rights are interdependent and 
indivisible.98 In order to fulfil a person’s dignity both positive and negative rights 
must be given equal protection. All rights have positive and negative dimensions such 
as the right to a fair trial and subsequently socio-economic rights should not be given 
less prominence than civil and political rights.  
 
2.2.2 Socio-economic rights are imprecise 
The argument is that socio-economic rights are conceptually imprecise, for example 
what does the right to health include? Scott and Macklem argue that they are much 
more precise than people think.99 They argue that in fact non-entrenchment of the 
rights has led to the imprecision as courts have not accumulated a body of experience 
in the area.100 In any case even civil and political rights are not that precise, for 
example, the right to life includes questions as to whether abortion or the death 
penalty should be permissible. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights has adopted 18 general comments interpreting various socio-economic rights 
and the obligations of states. These general comments have helped to provide insight 
into the meaning of these rights. Jurisprudence on these rights has also started to 
emerge. For example, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has handed down a 
number of important decisions defining socio-economic rights and the obligations 
they give rise to.101 Likewise, the African Commission on Human and peoples Rights 
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has delivered two important decisions concerning these rights.102 These decisions 
clearly establish that both negative and positive obligations of states in relation to 
socio-economic rights can be enforced through courts.   
    
2.2.3 Socio-economic Rights are not capable of immediate implementation. 
The concept of “progressive realisation” of socio-economic rights stems from the 
practical fact that it is not always possible to give immediate effect to them because 
they require the allocation of resources. Thus some of these rights must be realised 
over time. Some observers see this as a problem as they argue that a right should be 
capable of immediate enforcement. It must be observed that this problem also exists 
with respect to some civil and political rights such as the right to a fair trial.  
However, the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights acknowledges that 
the implementation of socio-economic rights under the ICESCR differs from that 
under the ICCPR which requires an immediate duty to respect and ensure all the 
rights contained therein.103 According to the Committee progressive realisation does 
not mean that states should postpone their obligations. Rather, Article 2(1) of the 
ICESCR places an obligation on states to take steps “with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised”.104 The Covenant also 
obliges states to “move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal” 
without taking deliberately retrogressive measures.105 The Limburg Principles state 
that “[t]he obligation of progressive achievement exists independently of the increase 
in resources; it requires effective use of resources available”. This interpretation of 
progressive realisation was also adopted by the South African Constitutional Court in 
Grootboom.106 Despite the fact that the South African Constitution adopts the 
language of progressive realisation in some of its socio-economic rights provisions, 
this case established that courts may enforce positive obligations implicit in such 
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rights through the benchmark of reasonableness. Significantly, notwithstanding the 
fact that these rights are supposed to be realised progressively, they also generate 
negative obligations and can thus be used to stop the state from interfering with 
current access to these rights. Thus, for example, in the Purohit case107 the applicants 
alleged that the Gambia had violated various rights under the African Charter 
including the right to health. They claimed that the Lunatic Detention Act provided 
inadequate protection of the rights of mental patients. They argued that there were no 
safeguards for people during the diagnosis, certification and detention as mental 
patients; the psychiatric unit where mental patients were detained was overcrowded 
and had poor living conditions; and consent was not obtained from the patients before 
treatment was given. The African Commission found that Gambia had violated 
several rights under the Charter, including the right to health. They also considered 
the fact that poverty in Africa prevented millions from fully enjoying the right to 
health. Subsequently, the Commission interpreted Article 16 on the right to health as 
obliging states to “take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full advantage of its 
available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised in all its aspects 
without discrimination of any kind”.108  
  
Progressive realisation is not the ideal situation, ideally all rights should be given 
immediate effect, however, one must recognise the restraints and limitations of the 
state. When it comes to progressive realisation certainly the deprived masses would 
rather have half a loaf than none. However, the situation can be managed by the 
judiciary putting time limits for implementation and setting up commissions to 
monitor progress109 as the Supreme Court in India has done110.  
 
2.2.4 The enforcement of positive rights forces the government to interfere with 
free markets 
This argument is advanced in relation to countries such as Zambia that have free 
market economies. The idea behind the argument is that a constitution that restrains 
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the operation of free labour markets is counter-productive.111 Sunstein uses the 
example of the Hungarian Constitution which protects the right to equal pay for equal 
work and the right to an income in conformity with the quantity and quality of work. 
He states that the provision will have one of two consequences: 1) either the courts 
will have to monitor labour markets closely or 2) the rights will be treated as 
aspirations rather than legally enforceable rights.112 He admits that although the 
Hungarian example is an extreme case scenario, similar problems could arise 
regarding other rights such as rights to specified maximum working hours or paid 
parental leave113. He thus argues that these rights have no place in a constitution but 
should be placed in ordinary legislation.114 The first scenario painted by Sunstein 
sounds akin to some sort of pervasive Big Brother operation by the courts. This 
argument ignores the fact that even negative rights such as the right to freedom of 
expression are subject to restrictions. Similarly, the freedom to have free markets 
must also be subject to some sort of checks to ensure that workers rights are not 
trampled upon. In the same way that civil and political rights like freedom of speech 
are restricted, such as the right not to be defamed, free markets must also be checked 
for abuses for example against workers rights. The second scenario is a possibility but 
seems less likely where these rights are enshrined in the Bill of Rights as there is that 
added recognition and therefore legitimacy by the judiciary and the government.  
 
2.2.5 The Judiciary is not competent to adjudicate over matters that affect 
government policy 
Cass Sunstein argues that “Courts lack the tools of a bureaucracy. They cannot create 
government programs. They do not have systematic overview of government policy. 
It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect courts to enforce many positive rights”.115 This 
argument is addressed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
who state as follows: 
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While the respective competences of the various branches of government must be 
respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts are generally already involved 
in a considerable range of matters which have important resource implications. The 
adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which puts 
them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and 
incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and 
interdependent. It would drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the 
rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.116 
 
In other words, one should not unnecessarily narrow the judiciary’s terms of reference 
with relation to socio-economic rights, especially as the judiciary have proved to be 
quite capable of handling complex issues. For example, in the Canadian case of 
Finlay v. Minister of Finance of Canada, the court decided that the state cannot 
deduct amounts it may have erroneously overpaid people in welfare benefits as that 
would bring them below the level of minimum need.117  
 
Related to the issue of judicial competence is the argument that giving the judiciary 
powers to adjudicate over socio-economic rights contravenes the principle of 
separation of powers. Some writers have stated that the judiciary should not be 
allowed to make decisions that affect government policy because the judiciary would 
be intruding in policy matters that are the preserve of other branches government. The 
kind of adjudication the author is advocating does not involve creating policy but 
merely quashing policies or legislation that violate socio-economic rights, a form of 
judicial review.118 This way the judiciary gets to keep the government in check but 
allows it to find its own means of remedying the right violated in the manner that the 
South African and Indian cases have proceeded. The idea of judicial review does not 
negate the idea of supervision by the courts which can be an important means of 
ensuring state compliance. All the arguments against making socio-economic rights 
justiciable are essentially based on the claim that the judiciary is not best placed to 
adjudicate over such matters. According to McMillan: 
 
                                               
116
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘The domestic application of the 
[International] Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights]’ General Comment No 9, UN Doc 
E/C. 12 /1998/24, December 1998 (here after referred to as General Comment 9) at paras 9 & 10  
117
 Wiles at [*54]. 
118
 Etienne Mureinik, ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries: economic rights in the constitution’, (1992) 8 S Afr 
J Hum Rts p. 464 (hereafter referred to as “Mureinik” at p472. 
 23 
The essence of the judicial function in public law cases is three-fold: judges can 
impartially and skilfully interpret legislative rules; by doing so independently of the 
other arms of government they can bolster community confidence in the 
administration of the law; and they can check the misuse of authority by other arms 
of government.119 
 
This is true of adjudication of socio-economic rights which involves checks and 
balances on government policy. The South African Constitutional Court had this to 
say on the issue of separation of powers: 
 
It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in Courts making 
orders which have direct implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a 
Court enforces civil and political rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the 
right to a fair trial, the order it makes will often have such implications. A Court may 
require the provision of legal aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class of 
people who formally were not beneficiaries of such benefits. In our view it cannot be 
said that by including socio-economic rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred 
upon the Courts so different from that ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of 
rights that results in a breach of the separation of powers.120 
 
Clearly the South African Courts themselves do not see the task as insurmountable.  
Indeed the principle of separation of powers is never absolute.121 As a flexible concept 
it allows for deviations in order for checks and balances to be effective. In the South 
African case there has been no breach of the doctrine of separation of powers as the 
courts are merely exercising powers conferred on them by the Constitution. 
 
Mureinik observes that the “real difficulty in the way of enforcing economic rights is 
not that they entail expenditure, nor that they call for a decision about how much to 
spend, but that they call for a decision about how to spend”.122 Related to this idea is 
the argument that socio-economic rights are polycentric123 and subsequently “[n]o one 
has the right to something whose realisation requires certain uses of things and 
                                               
119
 J McMillan ‘Judicial restraint and activism in administrative law’, (2002) 30 Federal LR 335 cited 
in Pieterse at p 386. 
120
 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996, 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), at paras 76-78. 
121
 Pieterse at p. 386. 
122
 Mureinik, at p. 466. 
123
 Polycentric rights are rights which if implemented have resource implications for other competing 
rights see DM Davis, ‘The case against the inclusion of socio-economic demands in a bill of rights 
except as directive principles’, (1992) 8 S. Afr J Hum Rts 475 at p 477. 
 24 
activities that other people have rights and entitlements over”.124  These arguments are 
countered by van Bueren who says that there are many approaches to implementing 
socio-economic rights. This, she argues, should not be a hindrance to the adoption of 
justiciable socio-economic rights as the courts appear able to deal with the complex 
choices they have to make in cases involving civil and political rights such as 
balancing the right to privacy against the right to freedom of expression.125 Indeed this 
has been affirmed by the South African Constitutional Court.126 Just because there are 
many ways of solving a problem it does not make the solution chosen illegitimate. 
Pieterse states that provided that courts are presented with adequate evidence there is 
little they cannot do with regard to socio-economic rights.127 Also socio-economic 
rights rely just as much as civil political rights on the will of the state to respect the 
court’s ruling.  
 
2.2.6 Access to courts 
Cross argues that litigants are needed in order for rights to be enforced.128 More often 
than not potential litigants are poor with little or no resources to access the courts and 
employ qualified and competent counsel. This, he argues, means that wealthier 
litigants have an advantage over their poorer counterparts because they can afford 
better representation. These difficulties would greatly be reduced if the courts’ 
requirements for the standing of litigants were relaxed.129 The courts might also be 
more accessible if the state improved the legal aid system if it had adequate resources 
to do so. In India the court’s concept of social action litigation has greatly increased 
accessibility to the courts. The Indian Supreme Court has given standing to petitioners 
who did not have a real interest in the case, in the sense of something like property, 
but had suffered a “wrong against a community interest”.130 Petitioning procedures 
have also been relaxed; in one case a judge converted a letter in a newspaper into a 
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writ.131  The court often waives the court fees and appoints commissions to investigate 
matters on behalf of applicants.132 There has been some protest by respondents that 
the courts are disregarding traditional court procedures.133 However the Chief Justice 
has responded by highlighting the “need to forge new tools…for the purpose of 
making fundamental rights meaningful for the large masses”.134 While the author 
appreciates the efforts of the Indian courts in providing greater court access to the 
masses, the author believes that a balance must be struck between allowing more 
access to the courts and maintaining the efficient running of the administration of 
justice. The Indian courts are notoriously congested. The author subsequently 
advocates an adherence to normal court procedures with an increase in the capacity of 
legal aid and wider locus standi that allows affected individuals to be represented by 
interest groups.      
  
2.3 CONCLUSION 
There are no sustainable reasons why justiciable socio-economic rights should not be 
entrenched in the Zambian Constitution. This study has established that, contrary to 
what is commonly supposed, all rights, including civil and political rights, have 
positive and negative dimensions. Socio-economic rights are not imprecise because 
there are established standards by which states can assess their fulfilment of rights. 
Although these rights are to a large extent realisable progressively, this term does not 
grant a licence to states to postpone their obligations. As with civil and political 
rights, socio-economic rights only interfere with free markets to the extent that rights 
are violated. It has become increasingly acceptable for judges to be involved in 
matters concerning policy implementation. South Africa represents one of those 
countries where courts have succeeded in observing the fine lines of the separation of 
powers without shying away from deciding on socio-economic rights questions. 
Negative perceptions against these rights are increasingly being dispelled as more and 
more jurisprudence on the enforcement of these rights is emerging. As Scott and 
Macklem put it: 
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If there is no forum that is socially recognised as authoritative and which individuals 
or communities of people similarly disadvantaged can make submissions about the 
profound barriers they face in attempting to lead meaningful lives, those difficulties 
will increasingly be deemed irrelevant, and the underlying values that social rights 
are designed to protect will diminish in meaning and importance.135 
  
Having established the validity of justiciable socio-economic rights the next Chapter 
promotes using the Bill of Rights as the best means of implementing them in Zambia.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS OF PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC CONSTITUTIONS 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are various ways in which socio-economic rights have been given effect 
domestically in different jurisdictions, both indirectly and directly. This Chapter will 
look at the different ways in which socio-economic rights have been protected in 
various countries around the world namely: the use of directive principles of state 
policy; protection through guaranteeing civil and political rights; and the Bill of 
Rights; through national legislation; and through public institutions. In Zambia socio-
economic rights are contained in the directive principles of state policy, they are never 
referred to as rights as they are non-justiciable.136 As earlier mentioned there is no 
jurisprudence on socio-economic rights in Zambia. This Chapter will also evaluate the 
different methods of implementing socio-economic rights and justify the need for 
them to be enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Zambian Constitution.  
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3.2 INDIRECT WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS 
Socio-economic rights are more commonly given effect indirectly through the 
interpretation of civil and political rights where socio-economic rights are not 
enshrined in a constitution.137 The following are examples of indirect protection given 
to these rights in different jurisdictions: 
 
3.2.1 Directive principles of state policy: comparative practices on their 
significance  
Directive principles of state policy are meant to be non-justiciable aspirations of the 
State. They are subsequently contained in a constitution separate from the Bill of 
Rights. This section will compare and contrast the protection given to socio-economic 
rights under directive principles of state policy in Nigeria and India. 
 
3.2.1.1 Directive principles of state policy in Nigeria 
In Nigeria directive principles of state policy were first introduced in the Second 
Republic Constitution of 1979. They included aims and principles relating to “social 
well-being, social justice political stability and economic growth”.138 Since their 
creation, the Nigerian courts have re-affirmed the non-justiciability of these rights. In 
Okogie v. Attorney General of Lagos State139 the plaintiff, the trustee of Roman 
Catholic schools, contested the abolishment of private primary schools on the ground 
that it contravened the right to freedom of expression.140 The government argued that 
private schools were contrary to the principle of “equal and adequate educational 
opportunities” provided for in the directive principles of state policy. The Court ruled 
that the words “equal and adequate educational opportunities” did not necessarily 
restrict persons from forming private educational institutions and that the directive 
principle could not override a fundamental justiciable right.141 This decision was 
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upheld in the case of Adewole v. Jakande, Governor of Lagos State.142 The directive 
principles of state policy were only first referred to as rights in the 1991 case of 
Uzuokwu v. Ezeonu II143 where the Court stated that: “…there are rights which may 
pertain to a person which are neither fundamental nor justiciable in the court. These 
may include rights given by the Constitution as under the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy under Chapter II of the Constitution”.144     
 
In the case of the Attorney General of Ondo State v The Attorney General of the 
Federation of Nigeria,145 the Supreme Court Nigeria recognised that, while the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy are non-justiciable: 
“they remain mere declarations, they cannot be enforced by legal process but would 
be seen as a failure of duty and responsibility of State organs if they acted in clear 
disregard of them … the Directive Principles can be made justiciable by 
legislation”.146 
 
Like most states with directive principles of state policy the Nigerian courts have 
shown reluctance to give effect to socio-economic rights where they are not 
specifically made justiciable, perhaps for fear of contravening the doctrine of 
separation of powers or for other reasons referred to in the previous chapter. The 
Indian courts, by contrast, have not let such fears hold back the alleviation of the 
poverty and suffering of the masses, this model will be examined below. 
 
3.2.1.2 Directive principles of state policy in India 
In India, socio-economic rights are also recognised as directive principles of state 
policy and lay dormant in the Constitution for many years after they were created. 
However, in the 1980’s the Indian Supreme Court took it upon itself to redress the 
plight of the impoverished masses and make the socio-economic values count and so 
began a stream of what is referred to as “social action litigation”. In People’s Union 
for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,147 a workers’ advocacy group wrote a letter 
to the Supreme Court on behalf of a group of construction workers who were being 
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paid less than the minimum wage.148 The Court admitted the letter under its 
“epistolary jurisdiction” and held that the workers’ group had standing on behalf of 
the construction workers.149 The Court found that payment of less than the minimum 
wage amounted to a violation of Article 23 of the Indian Constitution which prohibits 
human trafficking and forced labour.150 It went further to say that the government had 
failed in its duty under the Constitution to protect the workers and ensure that the 
minimum wage was enforced.151 
 
The Indian Supreme Court has interpreted Article 21, the right to life, very widely to 
embrace various directive principles of state policy. In the case of Olga Tellis v. 
Bombay Municipal Corporation,152  a group of pavement and slum dwellers 
petitioned the Court against the arbitrary eviction from the pavement and slum 
dwellings by the Bombay Municipal Council. The petitioners claimed that in being 
evicted they were being deprived of their livelihood, under Article 39 of the directive 
principles of state policy,153 and subsequently their right to life under the Bill of 
Rights. The Supreme Court of India upheld the claim. Thus, using the fundamental 
right to life to give effect to petitioner’s socio-economic needs under a directive 
principle of state policy.  
 
In the case of Pashim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity and Others v State of West Bengal 
and another,154 the applicant had received serious head injuries and suffered a brain 
haemorrhage as a result of falling out of a train.155 He was taken to several public 
hospitals all of which refused to treat him because, either the hospital did not have the 
necessary treatment facilities, or because it did not have any room for him to be 
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treated.156  Subsequently the applicant was forced to seek treatment from a private 
hospital.157 The judgment revealed that in fact the applicant could have received 
treatment from more than one of the hospitals that had refused to treat him.158 The 
court found that the persons responsible for making the decision not to treat him were 
guilty of misconduct159. In its ruling the Court said as follows: 
 
The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare state at the federal level as 
well as the State level. In a welfare State the primary duty of the Government is to 
secure the welfare of the people. Providing adequate medical facilities for the people 
is an essential part of the obligations undertaken by the Government in a welfare 
State. Failure on the part of a Government hospital to provide timely medical 
treatment to a person in need of such treatment results in violation of his right to life 
guaranteed under Article 21.160  
 
3.2.1.3 Critique of directive principles 
It is clear that directive principles lack the coercive power. Thus, when courts through 
judicial interpretation try to enforce them, they land into legitimacy problems. This 
has been the key backlash to the jurisprudence developed in India on this issue. The 
rulings of the courts there have sometimes been ignored by the government on the 
grounds that the courts have been too intrusive into the exercise of state powers. Such 
reactions compromise the authority of the Court and underline the inappropriateness 
of directive principles of state policy. Although tensions between the court and other 
branches of government also arise where socio-economic rights are enshrined in the 
Bill of Rights, as nearly occurred in South Africa with the Treatment Action 
Campaign case,161 in the case of the latter, courts derive a legitimate basis for their 
action from the actual rights rather than conceived ones. It has thus been observed that 
the Indian judiciary have come to realise the potential risks of judicial activism and 
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has begun to backtrack from the initial cases of the 1980’s by adopting a more 
cautious approach.162 
 
It must also be pointed out that the directive principles of state policy approach 
depends heavily on the will of the judiciary to construe the principles as fundamental 
rights, to accept the standing of otherwise unaffected people or groups and to actively 
engage itself in the promotion and supervision of the socio-economic condition of the 
people. 163 As a result, one cannot be certain about the outcome of a case. This may 
therefore deter individuals from instituting cases before courts.  
 
On the other hand one can argue that by interpreting civil and political rights broadly 
with the aide of directive principles of state policy, the Indian Supreme Court 
conceded that civil and political rights were in and of themselves not sufficient to 
protect human dignity and access to basic needs. The Indian courts have had to be 
creative to give effect to socio-economic rights in order to compel the government to 
fulfil its obligations. Without a binding Bill of Rights with socio-economic rights, 
states may implement these rights at their own pace without any fear of being held 
accountable.   
 
3.2.2 Protection of socio-economic rights through civil rights guarantees  
There are many countries whose constitutions protect civil and political rights only 
and socio-economic rights are not even recognised as aspirations of the state. Such 
constitutions reflect a liberal view of rights as negative injunctions. They also 
represent the traditional view that courts have no role to play in resource 
redistribution or, better still, that the guarantee of civil and political rights creates 
sufficient conditions for individuals to fulfil their potential and improve their socio-
economic status.  
 
A number of international monitoring bodies and some domestic jurisdictions have 
interpreted civil and political rights in a manner that gives implied protection to socio-
economic rights. This jurisprudence can be interpreted in two ways. The first is that it 
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helps to support the view that civil and political rights can adequately protect socio-
economic rights. The second is the opposite of the first. It is that this jurisprudence 
helps to demonstrate that civil and political rights are inadequate to protect people in 
the face of socio-economic depravity.  Thus, if courts are already impliedly protecting 
these rights, then there is no point in denying their usefulness and indeed their 
justiciability.  
  
3.2.2.1 Protection of socio-economic rights by the European Court of Human 
Rights  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which has powers to receive petitions 
from individuals, non-governmental organisations and groups alleging violations of 
the rights protection in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, has interpreted civil and political rights broadly to give 
some protection to what are clearly socio-economic claims.164 
 
In Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands,165 a woman argued that her right to a fair trial had 
been violated because she was denied the opportunity to appeal a decision by the 
state’s medical expert that she was fit to return to work.166 The Court held that her 
interest in the sickness benefits was a “civil right” under Article 6(1) because 
although it contained elements of both private and public law, the private law 
elements were more predominant as the insurance was paid for by individuals and 
employers and insurance coverage was based on a private contract normally linked to 
employment.167 
 
In Salesi v. Italy,168 the Court used the rule in Feldbrugge to appeals from denials of 
disability benefits that were entirely state-funded169. No distinction was made between 
welfare benefits that were clearly governed by public law and employment benefits 
that were largely governed by private law.170 
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The ECHR has also used the non-discrimination provision under the Convention to 
protect socio-economic rights. In Gaygusuz v. Austria,171 the Court held that denial of 
emergency pension assistance based on nationality was a violation of Article 14 of the 
Convention, as read with Article 1 of Protocol 1.172 Mr Gaygusuz was a Turkish 
national who had lived in Austria for around eleven years during which had been 
making the required contributions to the unemployment insurance fund.173 He became 
ill and was unable to work and so applied for an emergency advance on his 
pension.174 The state denied his application on the basis that he was not an Austrian 
national as required by the Unemployment Insurance Act. The ECHR ruled that 
because the entitlement to emergency advance on his pension was connected to 
pension contributions, Article 1 of Protocol 1, which protects property rights, applied, 
having defined the pension as a “possession” within the meaning of the Article.175  
 
3.2.2.2 Protection of socio-economic rights by the state courts in the United 
States of America 
The constitutional practice in the United States of America is very interesting because 
the American Constitution is one of the most traditional constitutions in that it affirms 
civil and political rights only. While the Federal Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
read socio-economic rights into the Constitution,176 states courts have displayed a 
more positive attitude to these rights.  
 
For example, the Texas Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez and in Edgewood v. Kirby,177 the Court held that the Texas education 
funding system contravened the right to education in the Texas Constitution.178  The 
Court ruled that under the Texas constitution the state had a duty to provide “efficient 
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education” and that because the public school funding system was inequitable it was 
constitutionally “inefficient”.179  
 
In McCain v. Koch,180 the New York Appellate Division considered an application by 
homeless families to have emergency “safe, suitable and adequate” housing, 
relocation assistance, school transportation assistance and notice and hearing before 
termination of access to emergency shelter.181 They also appealed the state’s decision 
to award homeless families cash instead of shelter, against the background that 
homeless single individuals or couples that were childless were given shelter, on the 
basis that their right to equal protection was being violated.182  The Court awarded the 
families increased educational transportation allowances under the right to education, 
without specifying the amount.183 The Court granted the right to notice and hearing 
upon termination of housing benefits but excluded housing transfers from this right.184 
The Court refused to accept that there was a right to “reasonable minimal standards” 
of emergency shelter ruling that the adequacy of benefits awarded to the indigent was 
subject to the prerogative of the legislature.185     
 
3.2.2.3 Critique of the protection of socio-economic rights through civil and 
political rights 
The cases cited illustrate lucidly that where socio-economic rights are not directly 
provided for in the Bill of Rights the country’s citizens are at the mercy of the 
judiciary. While many countries have constitutions that recognise civil and political 
rights only, very few have been interpreted to advance access to socio-economic 
needs and benefits. In the context where judges have historically been conservative 
such as in Zambia, civil and political rights cannot be the solution to socio-economic 
deprivation and bridging socio-economic inequalities. As the Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural rights has stated: 
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Full realisation of human rights can never be achieved as mere by-products, or 
fortuitous consequence of some other developments no matter how positive. For that 
reason suggestions that the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights will 
be a direct consequence of, or will automatically flow from enjoyment of civil and 
political rights are misplaced.186 
 
Even where judges are judicially active, interpreting civil and political rights in the 
manner demonstrated above raises the same legitimacy concerns that directive 
principles of state policy raised as has been shown above. 
 
Socio-economic rights play an important role in facilitating access to basic services 
and goods. They are key to ending poverty, which in turn prevents individuals from 
enjoying other rights. Socio-economic rights are also an end in themselves.  It is 
therefore critical that they be regarded as rights in themselves and should be protected 
expressly in the Constitution and not through the agency of civil and political rights.  
 
3.3 DIRECT PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN A BILL 
OF RIGHTS 
The 1990’s brought a wave of constitutional change to the African continent 
following the demise of communism and the advent of democracy.187 Socio-economic 
rights were included in the Bill of Rights of the Constitutions of  Benin (1990), Cape 
Verde (1990), Sao Tome and Principe (1990), Burkina Faso (1991), Gabon (1991), 
Madagascar (1992), Mali (1992), Niger (1992), Togo (1992), Seychelles (1993) and 
South Africa (1996).188  
 
The jurisprudence from South Africa has helped to demonstrate that socio-economic 
rights are justiciable. They are rights that are capable of content and the courts have 
been able to define the obligations of states. This jurisprudence has highlighted that 
socio-economic rights are justiciable both in their negative and positive sense. In 
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Government of South Africa v. Grootboom,189 which dealt with a claim by a group of 
squatters for temporary shelter under section 26 of the Constitution, the Constitutional 
Court stated that the question in South Africa was no longer whether socio-economic 
rights were justiciable or not, for clearly they were. It held that at least these rights 
should be negatively protected from infringement.190 Thus, the state was found liable 
for, among other things, violating this negative obligation for evicting the people in an 
inhumane fashion. In a number of other cases, the Constitutional Court has found 
violations of the negative obligation implicit in these rights.191 
 
The same case developed a benchmark for measuring compliance by states with their 
positive obligations - the so-called reasonableness test. According to the court: 
 
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of 
denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent 
and those whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be 
ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right.…If the measures, 
though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of the most desperate, they 
may not pass the test.192  
 
The court in Grootboom found that the government housing policy was not 
reasonable because “it fails to recognise that the state must provide for those 
in desperate need”.193   
 
The Grootboom case was confirmed in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action 
Campaign.194 In this case, the government appealed against a High Court decision 
ruling that the government should provide the mother-to-child HIV prevention drug 
Nevirapine in public health facilities throughout the country.195 Previously the 
government, which had been offered the drug free of charge for five years by the 
manufacturer, had only administered the drug in a pilot scheme in a few public health 
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clinics in three of the nine provinces countrywide.196 The petitioners argued that 
doctors in public health institutions should not be prevented from administering the 
drug where the patients had given their informed consent.197 On appeal the 
Constitutional Court affirmed that socio-economic rights were justiciable and that 
judges must exercise their powers to effect policy or legislation where it was 
appropriate to do so.198  This was significant in that it showed willingness on the part 
of the courts to engage in the issues despite the potential resource implications and the 
polycentricity of the claim. It reaffirmed the reasonableness standard required of 
states. However it obliges government to satisfy the needs of “those whose needs are 
most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril”,199 in this 
case the infants who require protection from the transmission of HIV/AIDS from their 
mothers.200 Most importantly, it reiterated that the concept of separation of powers is 
not absolute and that courts could make decisions that impact on policy.201 
 
Through the development of the reasonableness test, South African courts have been 
able to steer clear of usurping the functions of other branches of government. 
Although the standard has been subjected to sustained critiques, it provides a basis for 
regulating judicial intervention and non-intervention in policy making and 
implementation. The Bill of Rights in South Africa has given the court the legitimacy 
to decide on socio-economic rights issues and the government has less room to raise 
the legitimacy question when courts find it wanting in its obligations.  
     
3.4 NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
Under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR the use of legislation to realise socio-economic 
rights is described as ‘highly desirable’ and ‘in many cases indispensable’.202 
Legislation is crucial in that it provides the details of how the rights are to be 
implemented. It has been observed, for example, that Sweden has a very strong 
welfare system with strong legislation implementing socio-economic rights.203 
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However, the Swedish government has begun to make cutbacks to welfare benefits 
that have led the judiciary to take a more active role in cases concerning socio-
economic rights such as housing.204  As a result, there is very little litigation in that 
area, indicating that it is expedient to have good social policies and legislation in 
place.205  
 
Some Constitutions provide that national legislation should be subject to international 
law which provides a broader base for the application of human rights and socio-
economic rights in particular. In South Africa the Constitution requires the courts to 
‘prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with 
international law’.206 This is a broader requirement than that under United Kingdom 
law.207  In the United Kingdom, there is a presumption by the courts that parliament 
intended to legislate in line with its international law obligations.208 Where there is 
any ambiguity in the national legislation the courts will refer to the international 
instrument to clarify that particular point of law.209 The United Kingdom’s 1998 
Human Rights Act requires that the courts interpret the legislation in a manner that is 
consistent with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.210 Before the Human Rights Act, the courts used to resort to 
some highly creative methods of giving effect to socio-economic rights.211  For 
example, in the 1990’s the Conservative government decided to deny asylum seekers 
welfare benefits if they made their application late.212 To redress this situation the 
Court of Appeal resorted to an old 1803 case213 in which the claimants were ordered 
to feed a starving family whose father was of a foreign origin.214 As Wiles points out, 
“[s]uch creativity of interpretation … is not always possible, and does not present a 
reliable approach”.215  
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 The advantage of using legislation to protect socio-economic rights is that it is 
specific which courts generally prefer.216 It is also the democratic way of 
implementing rights as legislation is passed by the legislature which is representative 
of the people.  It may provide for administrative remedies which may be quicker, 
cheaper and more accessible to poorer people than the court system.217 But the 
problem with legislation is that it may not provide directly enforceable socio-
economic rights.218 Also, there are no guarantees that even if adequate legislation was 
put into place it would remain there as it is subject to repeal and amendment without 
any special procedure unlike rights contained in a Bill of Rights. This may result in 
political compromises that deprive vulnerable groups of core rights. 
 
3.5 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS PROTECTORS OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Public institutions such as human rights commissions, ombudsman offices and public 
interest groups have a potentially important role to play in the protection of human 
rights.219 They can undertake a wide range of promotional activities in the area of 
human rights. Through these activities it is possible that socio-economic rights can be 
given some protection.  
 
A wide range of countries in Africa have established human rights commissions. They 
include South Africa, Namibia, Uganda and Ghana. Section 184(3) of the South 
African Constitution, for example, grants the Commission the power to require organs 
of state to report to it on measures they have taken to realise the rights to housing, 
health care, food water, social security, education and the environment.220 The 
Commission can use this information to: 
 
(a) report to Parliament and the President on the observance of economic and social rights; 
(b) recommend changes to policy and legislation to relevant state organs; 
(c) help affected persons to get redress for violations of their socio-economic rights; 
(d) facilitate mediation or negotiation; and 
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(e) conduct further research or investigations.221  
 
As part of its role in protecting socio-economic rights it has even joined itself as 
amicus curiae in Grootboom. In South Africa the Public Protector plays an indirect 
role in protecting socio-economic rights.222 Under section 182 of the Constitution its 
functions are: “to investigate any improper conduct in state affairs or public 
administration, to report such conduct, and to take appropriate remedial action”. 
Mubangizi argues that in so doing, the Public Protector protects and enforces human 
rights as well as reduces human rights abuses.223    
 
National Institutions can be an important tool in protecting socio-economic rights. 
The good thing about national institutions is that they are more accessible than courts. 
However, they generally lack full judicial powers and subsequently do not offer the 
full range of remedies. They are useful in easing the courts’ burden for the more 
straight forward cases but, for cases requiring the full weight of the law, a court is 
more suitable. Subsequently national institutions can only play a complimentary role 
to the courts. They cannot replace the role of courts or judicial remedies. As the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated: “a Covenant right 
cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, judicial remedies 
are necessary”.224    
 
3.6 A COMBINATION OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT PROTECTION OF 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Some countries use a combination of direct and indirect protection of socio-economic 
rights. This is done by putting some socio-economic rights in the Constitution and 
leaving others as directive principles of state policy. This section will consider the 
situation pertaining in Malawi, Namibia, Uganda and Ghana. 
 
The only thing in favour of this combined approach is that it at least provides 
protection for some of the socio-economic rights that are contained in the Bill of 
Rights. However, on the other hand, leaving some rights out of the Bill of rights and 
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indeed out of the Constitution altogether means that there is no holistic approach to 
protecting socio-economic rights. The common theme running through the protection 
of socio-economic rights in all the countries mentioned is the lack of protection of 
basic socio-economic rights such as the right to food, health and housing in the Bill of 
Rights. Also significant is the failure of courts to be creative with the protection of 
rights that are not contained in the Bill of Rights in the way that the courts have been 
in India. Malawi has the right to development which has not yet been used to give 
effect to basic socio-economic rights that have not been included in the Bill of 
Rights.225 Similarly, Ghana has not used the umbrella clause in the Bill of Rights 
which protects rights that are not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights that are 
necessary in a democracy and which ensure the “freedom and dignity of man”226. The 
limited jurisprudence from these countries shows that the socio-economic rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights can be protected and that those that are not contained in 
the Bill of Rights generally are not. This leads to an imbalance in the protection of 
human rights and results in substantive inequality for the disadvantaged. Countries 
cannot pick and choose which rights to put in and which ones to leave out as that 
assumes that some rights are more important than others. This leads to the question - 
who gets to decide which socio-economic rights get protected and which do not? And 
on what criteria? The former Chief Justice of the Indian Supreme Court had this to 
say on the balance between the justiciable and non-justicable parts of the Indian 
Constitution: 
 
…the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Parts III and IV. To give 
absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony and 
balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is an essential feature of the basic 
structure of the Constitution.227  
 
This affirms the fact socio-economic rights and civil and political rights are 
interdependent and indivisible and should be treated as such in the Bill of Rights of all 
Constitutions. 
  
                                               
225
 Chirwa at p. 225. 
226
 Article 33(5) of the Constitution of Ghana. 
227
 ‘Fundamental rights, fundamental duties and directive principles of state policy’ (India) available at 
http://www.ncert.nic.in/textbooks/XI/indi-cont/CHAPTER4.pdf [accessed 01/03/07] citing Minerva 
Mills v. Union of India AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1789. 
 43 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
As the jurisprudence referred to above shows, unless there is political will on the part 
of the executive branch of government there is no way that courts will uphold socio-
economic rights unless there is clear constitutional protection for the enforcement of 
those rights. The efforts made by the courts in countries where socio-economic rights 
are not justiciable, particularly in India, are commendable but lack the legitimacy and 
guarantees provided by enshrining them in the Bill of Rights. Likewise the use of 
national legislation and public institutions, while useful, cannot by themselves 
guarantee full protection of these rights. One must have the ultimate right to claim 
their socio-economic rights from the government if they are not being provided. If 
only governments always heard the cries of their subjects and remedied their 
problems but the reality is that that they do not – at least not all the time. Citizens 
should be able to hold the government accountable without waiting five years till the 
next election. Judicial remedies are necessary and should be made available. As the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states: 
 
In relation to civil and political rights, it is generally taken for granted that judicial 
remedies for violations are essential. Regrettably, the contrary assumption is too 
often made in relation to economic, social and cultural rights. This discrepancy is not 
warranted either by the nature of the rights or by the relevant Covenant 
provisions…While the general approach of each legal system needs to be taken into 
account, there is no Covenant right which could not, in the great majority of systems, 
be considered to possess at least some significant justiciable dimensions.228    
 
For socio-economic rights to be upheld they must first be recognised by the judiciary, 
that is half the battle. The other half is to get the government to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of those rights and this dissertation argues that enshrining them in the Bill 
of Rights is the best way to do that.  
 
If the Constitution is not amended what then is the alternative to having socio-
economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Zambian Constitution? It would 
have to be the Indian approach combined with good national legislation and national 
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institutions like the Human Rights Commission with greater powers. But this comes a 
poor second best as the approach lacks certainty, legitimacy and consistency229.     
 
Having shown and critiqued the various models of protecting socio-economic rights 
and having concluded that enshrining socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights is 
the best approach for their protection, the next chapter looks at the need for justiciable 
socio-economic rights in the Zambian Bill of Rights. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE NEED FOR JUSTICIABLE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE ZAMBIAN CONSTITUTION 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters have made arguments for the introduction of justiciable 
socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights in general. This chapter of the study will 
now look at why Zambia in particular needs these rights in its Bill of Rights. The first 
part of this chapter will look at why the current government framework does not 
protect socio-economic rights adequately and how enshrining socio-economic rights 
in the Bill of Rights will improve the protection of these rights; the second part will 
look at how some of the conceptual issues raised in Chapter 2 can be addressed with 
regard to the implementation of socio-economic rights in Zambia; and the third part 
will discuss the role of socio-economic rights in reducing poverty.  
 
     PART I 
The concept of separation of powers, though not specifically included in it, is well 
established in the Constitution which assigns different functions to the executive, 
legislature and the judiciary.230 This part will look at the different arms of the 
Zambian government and analyse why the administrative, legislative and judicial 
system Zambia is using has failed to give adequate protection to socio-economic 
rights. 
 
4.2 THE INADEQUACY OF LEAVING SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY-
MAKING TO EXECUTIVE DISCRETION    
The powers of the executive are wide and far-reaching, particularly those of the 
President, as Professor Anyangwe puts it: 
 
Constitutionally, the powers of the African President are so tremendous that the 
office of the President has the appearance of a fourth governmental organ. He is the 
head of Government, head of State, head of the political party in power, and 
commander-in-chief of the defence forces; he has war powers, emergency powers, 
and treaty-making powers; he has power to initiate laws, to appoint and terminate 
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appointments to major public offices, to constitute and abolish offices, to nominate a 
limited number of legislators, to assent to and promulgate laws, to appoint when each 
session of Parliament shall commence, to prorogue the National Assembly, and to 
dissolve it; he presides at Cabinet meetings; confers honours and exercises the 
prerogative of mercy .231 Thus, the African President enjoys ‘the strengths of the 
British Prime Minister and the United States President without the weaknesses of 
either’232.233    
 
So how far does the executive use its powers to implement socio-economic rights? 
The executive does sometimes try and give effect to its international obligations 
through national policies such as the drives for “free” primary education, housing and 
to give free anti-retroviral drugs to HIV/AIDS carriers. However, these programmes 
have severe limitations: “free” primary education has hidden costs such as uniforms, 
learning materials and PTA234 fees;235 only 43,964 people are accessing free anti-
retroviral drugs out of a possible 183,000 in need of them;236 housing schemes have 
only been accessible to people from middle to higher income families, while 70% of 
the urban population live in unplanned settlements237. Recently, the government 
embarked on demolitions of unplanned settlements in Lusaka giving only seven days 
notice and no alternative accommodation.238 The government’s policies on socio-
economic issues have been criticised by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
for failing to provide adequate access of economic and social amenities and services 
to the poor. This has largely been blamed on successive governments’ implementation 
of economic policies prescribed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as 
the World Bank and the IMF.239 The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
mandated by the IFIs called for large scale privatisation of industries and 
liberalisation of the economy which led to massive job losses, neglect of basic 
                                               
231
 See Articles 33(1), 29(1), 30, 31, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 59, 60, 61, 68, 78 and 88 of the Constitution  of 
Zambia Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia. 
232
 Anyangwe citing DG Morgan, ‘Zambia’s one party state constitution’, 1976 Public law 42 . 
233
 The entire quotation is from Anyangwe at p 18. 
234
 Parent Teacher Association. 
235
 See JCTR Press Release: ‘JCTR study on education reveals no free primary education in Zambia, 
calls for scaling up of bursaries and school feeding programmes’, at http://www.jctr.org.zm/ 
bnb/prEDU06.html [accessed January 2007] 
236
 World Health Organisation, ‘Summary country profile for HIV/AIDS treatment scale-up’, 
December 2005 at paras 2 and 5. 
237
 ‘Zambia parallel state report on economic social and cultural rights’, March 2005, hosted by the 
Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection available at www.jctr.org.zm (now referred to as the Parallel 
Report) at p. 28 para 150. 
238
 The Post (newspaper of Zambia) Thursday 1 March 2007 at p. 1. 
239
 Parallel Report at p.40 section 4.2. 
 47 
infrastructure, fees for basic needs such as health, an increase in the cost of living, and 
the problem of street children240. External debt has severely reduced the state’s 
capacity to provide social and economic rights such as health and education241. 
According to Jubilee-Zambia efforts to reach the Highly Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) completion point242 had strong policy implications for the realisation of an 
adequate standard of living.243   
 
As a conditionality of debt relief under the HIPC Initiative, Zambia was required to 
develop a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with the participation of a 
spectrum of civil society groups.244 The PRSP was initially implemented between 
2002 to 2004 but was extended to December 2005. The intention was to increase 
growth and reduce poverty by developing budgets that are pro-poor and pro-
growth.245 The PRSP identified several barriers to reducing poverty: lack of growth, 
high inequality, heavy debt, high donor dependency, poor prioritisation, inadequate 
social safety nets and the scourge of HIV/AIDS.246  The Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning was in charge of co-ordinating the implementation, evaluation and 
monitoring of the PRSP with the participation of line ministries, international donors 
and civil society groups. Monitoring was done through budget monitoring and 
expenditure tracking.247 In monitoring the impact of the PRSP the Civil Society for 
Poverty Reduction (CSPR) stated that in practice policy implementation was effected 
by the government was “weak”.248 There was little improvement to access to health, 
education, water and sanitation and employment opportunities, particularly in the 
rural areas.249 Although there was an increase in enrolment from grades 1-7 as a result 
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of the policy on free basic education it resulted in a decrease in the quality of 
education due to inadequate facilities and teaching staff.250 Many pupils are not able 
to proceed to grade 9 and above because free basic education does not extend to 
secondary school.251 Access to health care is hampered by long distances to health 
centres, drugs are in short supply, the cost of services is prohibitive and there are only 
a few staff.252 Food security is threatened due to a decline in the farming industry;253 
this was due to farmers’ inability to afford subsidised inputs.254 Water and sanitation 
hardly improved because there was no programme to expand these facilities.255 
 
 The purpose of monitoring by civil society was to capture the views of stakeholders 
and ensure that implementation of the PRSP was on course.256 Communities 
complained that they were not involved in the identification, planning or 
implementation of strategies aimed at reducing their poverty. And clearly, although 
the CSPR was monitoring and reporting back to the Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning, most of their recommendations were not being heeded. The PRSP has also 
been criticised for being just another form of SAP as it came with privatisation of 
public utilities, removal of subsidies, the promotion of exports and foreign investment 
and import liberalisation,257 all of which are retrogressive measures in the fight for 
socio-economic rights. It is clear that in practice the PRSP did not take a human rights 
approach. Zambia has embarked on a similar Fifth National Development Plan from 
2006-2010.258 If the government fails to give socio-economic rights the prominence 
they deserve, history will repeat itself. 
 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has made recommendations 
on some of Zambia’s policies including that Zambia: 
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(i) take its obligations under the ICESCR into account when negotiating with 
IFIs to ensure that Zambians rights under the Covenant are protected, 
particularly those of the most disadvantaged and the marginalised;259 
(ii) Provide street children with centres for rehabilitation for physical and 
sexual abuse as well as provide them with food, clothing, housing, health 
care and access to education as recommended by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC/C/15/Add.206 at para 69);260 
(iii) Provide an adequate standard of living, “including through the provision of 
social safety nets to the most disadvantaged and marginalised groups, in 
particular those women and children who have been hardest hit by 
structural adjustment programmes, privatisation and debt servicing”;261 
(iv) Strengthen its National Strategic Plan to make sure that it achieves its aim 
of providing free and compulsory basic education by 2015;262 and 
(v)  Endeavour to control the spread of the HIV virus by providing 
reproductive health services, especially to women and young people.263 
 
The problem with relying on the executive to implement socio-economic rights is that 
it is under no obligation to create policies that take these rights into account. This can 
clearly be seen by government’s failure to negotiate policies with the IFIs that foster 
socio-economic rights. The PRSP, which was promising in that it involved the 
participation of the public through civil society groups, made few inroads into poverty 
reduction despite monitoring by the government and civil society. There are no 
mechanisms in place for holding the executive accountable for inadequate policies. 
There is need to enshrine socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights so that 
governments can incorporate them into policy making and be held accountable when 
they do not.  Accountability through the courts is necessary to define the state’s 
obligations in relation to socio-economic rights and to provide remedies when rights 
violations occur.   
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4.3 THE INADEQUACY OF THE LEGISLATURE AS A MEANS OF 
PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Under Article 62 of the Constitution ‘the legislative power of the Republic of Zambia 
shall vest in Parliament which shall consist of the President and the National 
Assembly’.264 The Constitution specifies the extent of Parliament’s legislative 
powers. The role of Parliament is to: 
 
make law for peace, order and good government. But it may not pass any Act 
purporting to derogate from constitutional provisions. It may not alter the 
Constitution otherwise than in accordance with the stringent amendment procedure 
laid down in it for doing so.265   
 
According to the principle of separation of powers, no branch of government can 
interfere with the powers assigned to another branch of government.266 However, 
without exception every successive government has had a clear majority in 
parliament. In 2001 the ruling MMD party had 69 out of 150 parliamentary seats267 
and in 2006 it obtained 48.7% of the parliamentary seats268 in the elections held in 
those years. The President has the power to nominate up to eight members of 
parliament.  Effectively the party in power controls the executive and the legislature 
making it easy for it to push forward its agendas. Consequently, if socio-economic 
rights are not on the agenda of the governing party they will not be given the attention 
due to them. Given that the directive principles are merely aspirations of the state, 
there is nothing obliging the legislature to create laws that promote socio-economic 
rights. Enshrining these rights in the Bill of Rights would make them foremost rather 
than incidental to the law-making process.  
 
The legislature has however passed several pieces of legislation that support socio-
economic rights in the field of equality and discrimination covering education and 
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women’s rights; 269 general  labour laws and conditions of service270; social security271 
and intestate succession.272. Most of the enforceable rights are in the area of labour 
law. These Acts do not specifically provide for human rights however they can be 
interpreted to give effect to certain human rights such as the right to work and the 
right to a pension.  However, there are some inadequacies in the, for example, the 
Minimum Wages and Conditions of Service Act Chapter 276 of the Laws of Zambia 
excludes domestic workers from its application. There are no unemployment, sickness 
or disability benefits. There is no specific legislation on the right to food, health, or 
education. Zambia cannot be described as a welfare state – far from it, the people 
have to fend for themselves. The provisions that do relate to socio-economic rights are 
not measured against a standard provided by a constitutional right. If the law is 
inadequate one has no further recourse. The people are at the mercy of the legislature 
to provide adequate laws to protect their rights many of which currently do not exist 
like the right to health, food, education and housing. There are government policies on 
these issues but they have not been converted into laws, for example the policy on 
free basic education. Without justiciable socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
laws inconsistent with these rights cannot be challenged and many rights that are not 
put into law are left unprotected.    
  
4.4 THE FAILURE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PROTECTING SOCIO-
ECONOMIC  RIGHTS   
The principle of constitutional supremacy implies that the judiciary is supposed to 
make sure that all laws are consistent with the Constitution.273 The powers are 
deducible from the following constitutional provisions: 
 
• Article 1(3) provides that any law inconsistent with the Constitution is void to 
the extent of the inconsistency; 
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• Article 28(1) gives the High Court the jurisdiction to hear matters related to 
the infringement of any of the fundamental rights and freedoms; 
• Article 94(1) gives the High Court ‘unlimited and original jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any civil or criminal proceedings under any law’; and  
• Article 27 gives the courts the power to review the constitutionality of 
prospective legislation.  
 
Socio-economic rights have only been in the Constitution as directive principles of 
state policy since 1996. The Constitution states that, although they may be referred to 
as rights in certain instances, socio-economic rights are non-justiciable274. It took 30 
years before the concept of social action litigation275 was born so perhaps it has yet to 
come to Zambia. However, there are some aspects of the Zambian judiciary that make 
it unlikely, in particular when it comes to cases in which it comes into conflict with 
the executive. In Zambia judges are presidential appointees endorsed by the National 
Assembly.276 By their very nature, adjudicating socio-economic rights involves some 
policy decisions and judges should feel secure enough in their positions to be able to 
take a stand against the government if need be. In order to ensure that judges remain 
independent and impartial, judges must have security of tenure. However, the 
judiciary has experienced interference from the executive and perhaps as a result they 
have traditionally been conservative in their application of the law. The succeeding 
section will consider at the historical background to this problem.  
 
4.4.1 The First Republic 1964 -1972 
After independence Zambia was a multi-party democracy. However the jurisprudence 
over this period shows that the judiciary feared interference by the executive as 
illustrated by a number of cases. The case of Kachasu v. Attorney General277 involved 
a young Watch Tower believer who challenged the constitutionality of government 
regulations requiring school children to sing the national anthem and salute the 
national flag on religious grounds. The court upheld the regulations because the 
applicant had not established that they exceeded the interests of public security or 
public order. The court reasoned that national unity was a necessary requirement of 
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public security.278  In his judgment Blagden CJ cited the American case of Minerville 
School District v Gobitts279 where Frankfurter J said:  
 
A grave responsibility confronts this court whenever in the course of litigation it 
must reconcile the conflicting claims of liberty and authority. But when the liberty 
involved is liberty of conscience, and the authority is to safeguard the nation’s 
fellowship, judicial conscience is put to the severest test.  
 
This made it difficult for anyone to successfully challenge government measures 
intended to uphold public security.280  
 
Any fears the judiciary may have had about crossing paths with the executive were 
confirmed in what is popularly known as the “Skinner saga”,281 involving the first 
Chief Justice of Zambia, Mr. Justice James Skinner. In the Skinner saga two 
Portuguese soldiers had been convicted of illegally entering Zambia.282 The sentence 
handed down was in excess of the presiding Magistrate’s powers.283 Judge Evans 
called for the case to be reviewed and found that indeed the Magistrate had exceeded 
his powers.284 Judge Evans made the following comments: “There was nothing 
sinister on the part of the prisoners; they divested themselves of their weapons before 
entering Zambia and they came openly across the border in daylight after exchange of 
non-abusive words with the Zambian immigration officer who called them 
across…”285 Upon hearing of Judge Evans comments, an enraged President Kaunda 
called upon the Chief Justice to apologise on behalf of the judge.286 The Chief Justice 
refused to do so on the ground that the judge had acted in his own judicial capacity 
and there was nothing that could be done about it.287 Angered further by this response 
the President sent his party’s youth cadets to storm the High Court where they stoned 
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judicial staff and broke windows.288 The Chief Justice and a few expatriate judges, 
including Judge Evans, resigned. In subsequent cases the judiciary was more 
conservative in its interpretation of the law when it involved the violation of a right by 
the state289 
 
4.4.2 The Second Republic 1972 -1991 
The one-party state commenced on 13th December 1972.290 During this period civil 
liberties were stifled.291 Preventive detentions were common and subsequently so 
were applications for habeas corpus.292  Few such applications succeeded and those 
that did displeased the executive.293 As earlier noted, it is surprising that during this 
era in which the socialist ideology of Humanism was in place the government failed 
to implement justiciable socio-economic rights. However this was probably as a result 
of a fear by the executive that such rights would curtail its powers. 
 
4.4.3 The Third Republic 1991- 
Multi-party democracy returned to Zambia on 31st October 1991 and shortly 
afterwards the state of emergency was lifted. This brought a sense of optimism to the 
judiciary about their treatment by the executive.294 In Mulundika and Others v The 
People295 the applicants, members of the opposition UNIP party, held a public 
meeting without obtaining a permit as required by section 5(4) of the Public Order 
Act. They were subsequently arrested by the police on that account. In the 
Magistrate’s Court the accused’s Counsel raised a preliminary issue challenging the 
constitutionality of the Public Order Act. The issue was referred to the High Court 
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where the Act was upheld. On appeal the Supreme Court found that section 5(4) of 
the Act contravened Articles 20296 and 21297 of the Constitution. The decision was 
widely applauded by civil society. However, the Vice-President made remarks 
questioning the impartiality of the court.298  
 
Judge T.K. Ndhlovu comments that although more subtle than was previously the 
case, the independence of the judiciary is still interfered with by the executive.299 He 
however raises optimism that the Mulundika case300 is a turning point in the way 
judges decide cases without giving too much deference to the state.301 In recent times 
the case of Clarke v Attorney-General302 is another example of the judiciary taking a 
progressive approach. One hopes this will continue. If justiciable socio-economic 
rights are implemented the judiciary and the executive will have to cross paths many 
times. If people’s rights are to be fulfilled the judiciary must be independent and 
progressive. The next section will look at the tools the judiciary has had at its disposal 
to give effect to socio-economic rights.  
 
4.4.4 Tools the Judiciary has to give effect to socio-economic rights 
Having established that the trepidation on the part of the judiciary in deciding cases 
against the state must be overcome, it is necessary to consider what tools the judiciary 
has at its disposal to enforce socio-economic rights and why they have not been used 
to advance socio-economic rights.  
 
(a) International Law 
As earlier mentioned, the Constitution is silent on the question as to whether 
international law can be used to interpret domestic provisions. In the absence of 
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specific provisions prohibiting it, international law has been used as a tool of 
interpretation in Zambia but only in cases involving civil and political rights. In 
Clarke v Attorney General and the case of Longwe v Intercontinental Hotel 
Corporation303 the Court made specific reference to international law as a tool of 
interpretation. The Zambian Supreme Court has stated the following in regard to the 
use of international law in domestic courts: 
 
What is certain is that it does not follow that because there are these similar 
provisions in international instruments or domestic laws, the courts in the various 
jurisdictions can have or have had [a] uniform approach … we are at different stages 
of development and democratisation and the courts in each country must surely have 
regard to the social values applicable to their own milieu.304  
 
From this quotation it may seem as though the Zambian courts disregard international 
law in favour of local values. However, in the above-mentioned cases the courts have 
used international law in favour of protecting the domestic civil and political rights in 
question.  In the absence of socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights the Zambian 
courts could have used international law to protect socio-economic rights but to date 
they have not. It appears that the courts are only willing to use international law to 
interpret the civil and political rights contained in the Bill of Rights. This is probably 
because civil and political rights are considered to be legitimate rights because they 
are contained in the Bill of Rights and the socio-economic rights that are not 
contained in the Bill of Rights are not.  Enshrining socio-economic rights in the Bill 
of Rights would make enforcing them legitimate in the eyes of the courts.   
 
(b) Civil and Political Rights 
In the absence socio-economic rights in the Bill of rights, civil and political rights are 
the most obvious tool for giving protection to socio-economic rights. The Constitution 
has the same fundamental civil and political rights that in India have been read to give 
effect to socio-economic rights such as the right to life and yet to date no civil and 
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political rights have been read to give effect to socio-economic rights. This again is 
probably due to the fact that the courts do not want to be seen to be introducing 
“illegitimate” rights through the back door.  
 
The fact that the Judiciary has tools at its disposal to give effect to socio-economic 
rights that are not being used shows that they are unwilling to give protection to rights 
that are not contained in the Bill of Rights. It is therefore imperative that socio-
economic rights be enshrined in the Bill of Rights so that they too can be adequately 
and legitimately protected by the courts.  
 
4.5 THE INADEQUACY OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN 
PROTECTING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 Zambia has its own Human Rights Commission established by the 1996 
Constitution305 whose powers are contained in the Human Rights Commission Act.306 
Its functions are to investigate human rights abuses and to educate the public on 
human rights.307 It has the power to investigate abuses, summon witnesses and request 
the production of any document or record.308 Under section 13(2) it can make 
recommendations to the relevant authority which shall recommend any action to be 
taken within thirty days.309 Anyone who contravenes section 13(2) will be guilty of an 
offence and liable on conviction to a fine of up to ten thousand penalty units or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or both.310 The Human Rights 
Commission Act provides a wider standing than the courts. It includes representatives 
and interest groups as well as aggrieved individuals.311 Unfortunately, the mandate of 
the Commission does not extend to socio-economic rights312 so these remain 
unprotected. If socio-economic rights were enshrined in the Bill of Rights the Human 
Rights Commission could play a complementary role to the courts in protecting socio-
economic rights. However, the Human Rights Commission is widely perceived as 
                                               
305
 Articles 125-126 of the Constitution of Zambia Chapter 1 of the Laws of Zambia. 
306
 Act No 39 of 1996. 
307
 Op cit  Section 9. 
308
 Op cit section 10. 
309
 Op cit section 13(2). 
310
 Op cit section 13(3). 
311
 Op cit section 10(1). 
312
 Section 111 of the Constitution of Zambia provides that “[t]he directive principles of state policy 
…shall not be justiciable and shall not thereby, by themselves, despite being referred to as rights in 
certain instances, be legally enforceable in any court, tribunal or administrative institution or entity”. 
 58 
having no teeth, it cannot prosecute human rights violations nor does it have any 
coercive powers.313 The Mung’omba Commission has made recommendations that 
this should be redressed. 
 
     PART II 
Chapter 2 raised several conceptual arguments against the implementation of 
justiciable socio-economic rights. This part of the chapter will look at some of those 
conceptual issues with regard to how socio-economic rights can be implemented in 
Zambia. 
 
4.6 THE AFFORDABILITY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN 
ZAMBIA 
It is a commonly held belief that poor countries like Zambia cannot afford to enforce 
justiciable socio-economic rights because of a lack of resources. Some critics contend 
that only civil and political rights belong in the Bill of Rights because they do not 
involve any positive obligations on the state and are subsequently more affordable. 
However, as has previously been argued, all rights possess positive and negative 
dimensions. There have been cases in Zambia involving civil and political rights 
where a positive right has been read into a negative right. For example, in the case of 
Nyirongo v Attorney General,314 it was held that pursuant to Article 22, on the 
freedom of movement, a citizen has the right to travel and subsequently has the right 
to be issued with a passport. That involved a cost to the state. However, it is generally 
recognised that implementing socio-economic rights has more resource implications 
for the state than implementing civil and political rights does, hence the concept of 
progressive realisation. How can Zambia afford socio-economic rights? The 
Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has recommended that countries 
adopt the minimum core standard in enforcing socio-economic rights.  This involves 
providing the minimum essential requirements for each right. This would probably 
prove to be too expensive for a country like Zambia that has millions of poor people 
and very little resources. However, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has stated that where a country is unable to meet the minimum core standard it 
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must prove that it has tried its best to meet its minimum obligations.315 In other words 
the country need only provide what it can afford to. The reasonableness test 
developed by the South African court also caters for countries that are unable to meet 
the minimum core standard. Under the reasonableness test a country must do what it 
can to provide for the needs of the most desperate in society. Both approaches require 
the state to prioritise its resources and use them optimally. There is no reason why 
Zambia, or indeed any state, should fail to do this. 
 
There is a general trend to implement justiciable socio-economic rights both in 
international instruments and in the domestic constitutions316 of countries with 
comparable economic situations to Zambia. After socio-economic rights were 
incorporated into the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”) 
adopted in 1986 several African countries included socio-economic rights in their Bill 
of Rights in the 1990’s. Some of them adopted all the socio-economic rights in the 
Bill of Rights317, including the new right to development introduced by the ACHPR. 
Others only introduced some of the rights into the Bill of Rights leaving the others 
unprotected.318. The optional Protocol to the Covenant on the Elimination of 
Discrimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted on 6th 
October 1999.319 It allows individuals and groups to make complaints about the 
violation of their rights under the Covenant, including their socio-economic rights.320 
The Committee can also make an inquiry into the violations of women’s rights in a 
particular country. There are moves being made towards the adoption of an optional 
protocol to the ICESCR which will include an individual complaints mechanism.321  
There is an international recognition of the fact that socio-economic rights must be 
made justiciable in order for violations of these rights to be adequately remedied in 
the same way that civil and political rights are. This finally enforces declarations that 
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the two sets of rights are interdependent and indivisible.322 As indicated above, 
enforcing these rights does not oblige countries to spend beyond their means. 
Countries like South Africa have shown that people can claim socio-economic rights 
from domestic courts without crippling the economy of the country.  Zambians too 
can afford to have their day in court.  
 
4.7 THE COMPETENCE OF THE JUDICIARY TO ADJUDICATE OVER 
POLICY ISSUES  
The Zambian judiciary has been adjudicating over administrative breaches of civil 
and political rights through the mechanism of judicial review since independence. As 
the case of Nyirongo v. The Attorney General323 shows this can involve placing 
positive obligations on the state. It is therefore very possible for the judiciary to 
review the constitutionality of policies, administrative decisions and legislation 
regarding socio-economic rights under Article 28 of the Constitution, where a 
petitioner can seek redress for a violation of any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
Regarding the issue of the judiciary’s adjudication of socio-economic rights 
infringing on the principle of separation of powers, the principle of separation of 
powers in Zambia is a flexible one. For example, Parliament may delegate some of its 
legislative powers to make statutory instruments to certain authorities. The role of the 
judiciary is to uphold the law and protect the Constitution. Subsequently the state 
does not have absolute power to make arbitrary administrative decisions. As 
Anyangwe states: 
 
The principle of constitutional supremacy presupposes judicial control of the 
constitutionality of laws; a peace-maker in matters of constitutional checks … the 
principle by necessary implication enjoins the courts to ensure that all other laws are 
in conformity with the Constitution.324 
   
As argued earlier325 judicial review does not necessarily involve policy-making but 
merely the sanctioning of policies, administrative decisions and legislation that violate 
laws in general and the Constitution specifically. In this way the judiciary will not 
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infringe on the principle of separation of powers and will in fact be adhering to its 
mandate. The author agrees with the Mwanakatwe and Mung’omba Commissions’ 
recommendations that a separate Constitutional Court is needed to deal with 
constitutional issues. This will ensure that litigants get justice quickly and that the 
other courts will not get congested with such matters. 
 
4.8 ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
Currently there is limited access to the Zambian courts. The Supreme Court in the 
case of Nkumbula v The Attorney General326 held that for an individual to have locus 
standi “there must be an actual or threatened action in relation to him”.327 This rules 
out court applications by interest groups acting on behalf of affected persons. This 
may affect the access of indigent litigants to the Zambian courts. However, the 
Supreme Court is not bound by its previous decisions and it may decide to extend the 
locus standi to accommodate interest groups.  As earlier mentioned increasing the 
capacity of legal aid would also improve access to the courts. 
 
     PART III 
After having considered the fact that there is no system for protecting socio-economic 
rights, and having considered some of the conceptual reasons why it can work, this 
section now looks at the important role justiciable socio-economic rights can play in 
reducing the scourge poverty in Zambia. 
  
4.9 POVERTY AND THE ROLE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has defined poverty as: 
 
a human condition characterised by the sustained or chronic deprivation of the 
resources, capabilities, choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an 
adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social 
rights.328 
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This definition implies that poverty is not just a lack of economic or material 
resources but constitutes a violation of human rights, including socio-economic 
rights.329 Without socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights the poor cannot claim 
the violation of their rights. 
 
Poverty has many manifestations, including lack of income and productive resources sufficient to 
ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to 
education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness 
and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also 
characterised by a lack of participation in decision making and in civil, social and cultural life.330 
 
In a democracy where 68% of the population are living in poverty this is very 
worrying indeed. According to Marshall, citizenship is “…a status bestowed on those 
who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with 
respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed”.331 Because people 
are unable to participate effectively in the democracy they are also unable to change 
their circumstances, they become second or third class citizens. This should not be 
tolerated in a democratic society such as Zambia where all people are meant to be 
equal. According to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights “[a]nti-
poverty policies are more likely to be effective, sustainable, inclusive, equitable and 
meaningful to those living in poverty if they are based upon international human 
rights”.332 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
has developed a set of guidelines for the integration of human rights into poverty 
reduction strategies.333 Section 1 of the guidelines states the principles of the human 
rights approach that should be applied in creating poverty reduction strategies. Section 
2 identifies the strategy for realising the rights relevant to poverty reduction which 
include the right to adequate food and the right to health, education, decent work and 
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adequate housing. Section 3 describes the way that the human rights approach can be 
used to direct the monitoring and accountability of the process. In making the 
Guidelines the following were taken into account: 
 
• Rights and obligations demand accountability. 
• The twin principles of equality and non-discrimination are among the most fundamental 
elements of international human rights law. 
• A human rights approach to poverty reduction requires active and informed participation by 
the poor in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of poverty reduction strategies. 
• The interdependence of human rights – the fact that the enjoyment of some rights may be 
dependent on or contribute to the enjoyment of others – should be recognised. 
• Responsibility for poverty reduction is a universal obligation. 
• Resource constraints ought to be recognised and an allowance made for progressive 
realisation of rights over a period of time and for the setting of priorities in the course of 
progressive realisation.334 
 
If Zambia did use these guidelines in formulating the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper it did not apply them very well. There is no systematic application of human 
rights in poverty reduction strategies because there is no obligation upon government 
to do so. As shown, poverty and socio-economic rights are interrelated and 
interdependent.335 For the millions that languish in poverty, enshrining socio-
economic rights in the Bill of Rights provides the hope that the state will be forced to 
consider these rights in creating legislation and implementing policies, particularly 
those related to poverty reduction. As the Guidelines state “rights and obligations 
demand accountability”.336 
 
 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
It would appear that the executive is mainly to blame for the fact that socio-economic 
rights are not being adequately protected in Zambia. In its desire to satisfy the 
international monetary institutions the government has caused potentially poverty 
alleviating policies to suffer. Despite the country upholding the principle of separation 
of powers the fact that the executive has a stronghold in parliament and does 
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intimidate the judiciary means that it is difficult to hold the executive accountable for 
deficiencies in its policies. As Anyangwe says: 
 
With such enormous powers, checked only by the process of judicial review timidly 
undertaken by a timid judiciary, by the rare political control device of impeachment 
and by uncertain adherence to the democratic value of periodical free and fair 
elections, it comes as no surprise that some presidents see themselves as the source of 
all authority in the state and as standing above the constitution which, in any event, 
they regard as their personal product to be used only when it suits them to do so.337 
 
So what difference would the introduction of socio-economic rights in the Bill of 
Rights make? It must not be forgotten that in Zambia the Constitution is supreme law. 
That means that even the President is subject to the Constitution.338 If socio-economic 
rights were enshrined in the Constitution the people of Zambia would then own those 
rights and subsequently be able to lay claim to them forcing the government to apply 
them in administration, legislation and adjudication. Placing the rights in the Bill of 
Rights would give them an added protection because in order to amend the Bill of 
Rights the government must hold a national referendum339. Other methods of 
protecting socio-economic rights do not offer the same guarantees. As for the 
judiciary one can only hope that the Mulundika and Roy Clarke cases are a step in the 
right direction. Without their active participation socio-economic rights will be but a 
pipe dream. This chapter has shown that the conceptual hurdles to implementing 
socio-economic rights in Zambia can be overcome particularly as regards the 
affordability of these rights, judicial competence and access to the courts. The study 
has also shown that there is a link between poverty and human rights and that a 
holistic human rights based approach should be used in policies for the reduction of 
poverty.  The need for justiciable socio-economic rights is clearly demonstrable. The 
people of Zambia must be able to seek justice for the deprivation of all their rights.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A failure to entrench social rights is an act of institutional normatization that amounts 
to a powerful viewing of members of society by society itself. A constitutional vision 
that includes only traditional civil liberties within its interpretive horizon fails to 
recognise the realities of life for certain members of society who cannot see 
themselves in the constitutional mirror. Instead they will see the constitutional 
construction and legitimation of a legal self for whom social rights are either 
unimportant or taken for granted.340 
 
The majority of Zambians are impoverished and are subsequently marginalised in 
society. They are unable to enjoy the right to a decent standard of living and do not 
have access to adequate food, nutrition, shelter, education and other basic necessities 
of life. The state is responsible for providing amenities and services and if it does not 
citizens should have the right to claim them through the courts.  Historically, the 
Zambian Constitution has not afforded socio-economic rights the status of 
fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. Constitutional legitimacy is something that 
Zambians are striving for. The Mung’omba Commission recorded significant calls for 
socio-economic rights to be given the weight of the law. If the Constitution is 
amended, this time around the people of Zambia must have the final say as to what 
goes into the Constitution. The Mung’omba Commission noted that there has been a 
trend in the African region towards making these rights justiciable by including them 
in the Bill of Rights. It also noted that resource constraints should not prevent these 
rights from being implemented as the government can be made to deliver optimal 
services to the people within its available resources.  
 
The Mung’omba Commission’s call for justiciable socio-economic rights is 
conceptually justifiable. Chapter two considered the arguments usually advanced 
against making these rights justiciable. All of them centre on the nature of the rights 
and the fact that enforcement by the judiciary would infringe on the principle of 
separation of powers, which is entrenched in the Zambian Constitution. All these 
arguments have been rebuffed using jurisprudence from around the world leading to 
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the conclusion that there is no justifiable reason for not making these rights 
justiciable. 
 
The various ways in which socio-economic rights are protected in various domestic 
legal settings have been considered. These include directive principles of state policy, 
civil and political rights, national legislation, and national institutions. However, as 
this thesis has argued, the Bill of Rights approach is the best approach to protecting 
socio-economic rights in a manner that is legitimate and provides some certainty for 
applicants. If Zambia does not amend its Constitution the alternative method of 
protecting these rights would be to use the Indian approach. However, given the 
history of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, this approach is 
unlikely to be very successful particularly if the executive perceives the approach to 
be illegitimate in the sense that the judiciary would be creating justiciable rights that 
have not been provided for in the Constitution. 
 
Chapter four of this paper has demonstrated why Zambia needs to enshrine justiciable 
socio-economic rights in its Bill of Rights. In other words, why the current system 
does not adequately protect these rights and why the Bill of Rights approach would be 
more appropriate. The thesis has shown that the executive’s submission to the 
requirements of international financial institutions has affected its protection of socio-
economic rights. Although the legislature has promulgated some laws concerning 
socio-economic rights it has not provided for the full spectrum of rights. The fact that 
the executive virtually controls the legislature means that the checks and balances on 
the executive are somewhat restricted. Zambia has had socio-economic rights in its 
Constitution as directive principles of state policy for the last ten years and there is no 
jurisprudence to show for it despite the overwhelming deprivation in the country.  The 
history of cases in which the judiciary confronts the executive shows how the concept 
of judicial independence has been infringed to some extent by political interference 
causing judicial conservatism. The judiciary is the one organ that is designed to 
protect the sanctity of the Constitution and it is troubling to think that the judiciary 
can be intimidated into making decisions that support the executive. However the 
cases of  Mulundika and Others v The People and Clarke v The Attorney -General 
show that there is a way forward and that the judiciary is prepared to stand up to the 
executive and uphold and  protect constitutional rights. It has been argued that socio-
 67 
economic rights are needed in the Bill of Rights because the Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land - it is above even the executive. Placing these rights in the 
Bill of Rights is the ultimate protection. Amending the Bill of Rights would require a 
referendum so that the people have the final say. With the judiciary feeling bolder 
about confronting violations of the Constitution by the State the Zambian people 
would at last be able to hold the State accountable for deficient policies and service 
delivery without waiting for the next election. Given greater powers, the Human 
Rights Commission can play an effective complimentary role in protecting socio-
economic rights. However, the Zambian people must have the ultimate right to seek 
redress from the courts. The thesis has demonstrated that the conceptual issues 
surrounding the implementation of socio-economic rights in Zambia are surmountable 
in relation to affordability of the rights, judicial competence and access to courts. The 
study has also shown that there is a connection between poverty and a lack of socio-
economic rights. Given the extent of poverty in Zambia implementing socio-
economic rights in addition to civil and political rights in poverty reduction strategies 
would go a long way to alleviating poverty.  
 
This author recognises that most socio-economic rights must be achieved 
progressively within the available resources of the state. Zambia is one of the poorest 
nations in the world and there is no denying the fact that the Zambian government is 
severely resource-constrained. This, however, does not mean that Zambians cannot 
afford socio-economic rights. The implementation of socio-economic rights forces 
government to optimise its resources and be held accountable for failing to do so. 
Courts must demand proof that the State is doing all it can to realise these rights. 
Socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights must be made as accessible as possible so 
that the marginalised can reap the fruits of justice. Given that the executive has 
controlled the amendments to the last three constitutions, the best way to ensure that 
the people’s petition to the Mung’omba Commissions for the inclusion of justiciable 
socio-economic rights is implemented is through the implementation of a new 
constitution through a constituent assembly. But ultimately, in order to make these 
rights work judicial activism and political will are needed to give effect to these 
rights. Without these two factors socio-economic rights will remain mere aspirations 
of the State.      
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